Law and Order: Diyala

On June 11, 2010 a suicide carbomb struck a dismounted platoon of American soldiers conducting a combined patrol with police and other local security forces in a neighborhood of Jalula. The platoon was from 5-20 IN and had been attached to 1-14 CAV in order to provide the squadron with more manpower to conduct missions/patrols while still manning our 5 combined checkpoints meant to ease Arab/Kurd tensions. Two soldiers were killed and multiple others wounded in the worst attack against U.S. forces in the area in well over a year. The attack was the third suicide carbombing in 4 days targeting Americans in Diyala Province.

I took the attack as a personal insult as the intelligence officer for the squadron. Throughout the entire deployment fingers had been pointed at our area by Iraqi officials and senior American military officers as to where carbombs were coming from that struck in Baghdad and Baqubah. I constantly defended the area and pointed out that there was no evidence that carbombs were either being made in N.E. Diyala or being transported through the area. Only two carbombs had gone off previous to the 11 June attack in the region and I argued that there was no reporting or indication of a carbomb factory in our battlespace and the few carbombs that were being made were being used against targets locally. I had both the Squadron commander and the Brigade intelligence officer on my side.

By late June/early July my section and I had pieced together the puzzle of who was responsible and the timeline of events. Most of our usual suspects were the ones involved and had likely temporarily left the area in order to avoid being captured after the attack. There was one individual, however, who we knew to still be in the area, including the exact house he lived in. We believed he was the "Godfather" of AQI in the area and had a hand in, or at least knowledge of, most of the attacks that were conducted by the organization. His capture would at the very least send a message that no one was untouchable, at best he could provide a lot of good intelligence on AQI. The one problem? No warrant.

Late one night I had this discussion with the Division targeting NCO. He was questioning why we weren't actioning this guy if we knew exactly where he was. I of course mentioned the lack of a legal means of keeping him detained longer than 48 hours. The next afternoon Division sent me a warrant for the target. My anger that Division had a warrant for this guy when we didn't have it was tempered by my joy of now having the crucial piece of beauracratic lunacy to detain and hold this guy.

Unfortunately it was late...about 6pm at this time. I called the acting C troop commander (the commander having been relieved early in June and his replacement hadn't shown up yet) and we did a quick wargame of the situation. He said that it would be possible to get an Iraqi force together and we could use the Kurdish Peshmerga platoon we kept on Cobra for just such instances. However, by the time all the cats were herded, a plan was developed, and we got to the target location it would likely be around midnight or 2 am and the target would likely have gotten word we were coming. If we delayed and conducted the mission the next night there was still a substantial risk that the operation would be compromised and the target would flee.

We both decided to pass the target off to the task force whose sole purpose was to detain Sunni AQI targets quickly and on short notice if needed. After consulting the operations officer and letting him know my and Crazyhorse 6's plan I rang up the Brigade targeting officer (the S3 didn't really seem to care at all about the situation, after a brief "why isn't C troop going after the guy" he was pretty reserved about the whole thing). Brigade called the task force who determined that if the target was still in the same area that night then they would go after him the next night.

All worked according to plan and looking back it was a great coordination between troop, squadron, brigade, division, an outside task force, and ISR assets. The target was captured and while he didn't give up any information within a couple of weeks of his capture we were getting reports that other key AQI leaders in the area were attempting to flee.

There was just one turd in the punch bowl. While all fingers were pointing at this individual as well as the AQI network in the area, Kurdish intelligence in Khanaqin was pointing at Ansar al Sunna. The Khanaqin CID appeared so convinced that even the A troop commander was believing what they had to say. To top it off, Kurdish security in the Qara Tapa area began pointing to AAS (likely because they talked to Khanaqin) which got the B troop commander telling me it might be AAS. The problem was that AAS had desintegrated around 2007 and was no longer a threat. We had a few reports of them in the area but I had always chalked it up to misinformation on the part of AQI or JRTN. Was my assessment of this attack, and potentially the entire area, incorrect?

I tend to think I wasn't that blind to what was going on. C troop still maintained that AQI was behind the attack as was the Iraqi Army. AQI/ISI would later even claim credit for the three carbombs (the others being in Muqdadiyah and Khalis). The Kurds were doing a surge of information operations at the time to discredit the Iraqi security forces in the area and the reports that AAS was responsible included accusations against key Iraqi leaders who the Kurds blamed were either complicit in the attacks or actively took part. Sorry if I have my doubts. I also find it extremely unlikely that AAS would be able to coordinate three carbomb attacks in three completely different areas of Diyala in which they have little to no influence without anyone picking up on it.

One last tidbit from this whole situation. There may have been some involvement in the attack from our friendly intelligence agency/special forces organization to the east. In a note dated 24 June in my notebook..."I hate proxy wars".

*Note: I know I mentioned last blog about writing about our relationship with SOF organizations but I decided that would likely get me in real trouble despite being in limbo between units right now. All I'll say is this...Rangers are egotistical fucks who steal all your toilet paper and the Green Berets can't handle any criticism at all, pansies.

Lazy blogger day

I was going to write something interesting today about 1-14's relationship, occasionally contentious, with the different special forces units operating in Diyala Province. What may interest readers the most is how I apparently not only burned the bridge with the SF unit on FOB Cobra but also pissed on the remains of the bridge and then attempted to burn the thing all over again...all without me realizing it. In my defense the SF commander was kind of a douchewaffle.

But I'm feeling lazy today so I'll just write about some things I'm finding interesting today:

The Navy and Marines are sending a force back to the coast of Haiti just in case the Haitian government requests help in the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas. Super, I love using military power for good and helping neighboring countries. However, here's a question: how many times have we sent military forces to Haiti?

At least 10 times including a couple of occupations. So here's my thought for the day: why not build a Guantanamo Bay style military base in Haiti?Guantanamo is useful in its stragetic location in the Carribean but it has quite a stigma these days. I say after we shut down the detention center at Gitmo we begin construction on a base in Haiti...or potentially the Dominican Republic or Puerto Rico if the Haitians don't want us. We can even develop some good will by giving the base over to the Cubans. A base in Haiti would enable further aid and likely allow for a better response to disasters in the country, natural or man made; it's also conveniently closer to Venezuela...just sayin'.

Rumors out of Mali state a tribe from Timbukto (I love that name) fought with some Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb fighters and killed 4 of them. The Malinese government and military are denying the incident happened. Let's say the incident did occur, if so, why did a tribe start fighting with AQIM? Did AQIM overstep its bounds much like Al Qaida in Iraq did in the Anbar Province? Another thing, why would the government and military deny the incident? Is it because the clash was actually conducted by Malinese special forces...or even U.S. special forces? Things that make you go hmmmm.

Finally, add John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife to the list of books I should have read a long time ago...or at least before I deployed. I'm no where near finished but am fascinated by the counterinsurgeny examples Nagl uses in the book. One example: the Normans' conquest and subjugation of Wales. 30 years or so after the Normans conquered England they attempted the "kill em all including the livestock" approach when attempting to defeat a Welsh insurgency. 100 years later they used the "place garrisons in the populated areas and where the enemies hide" approach to remove the population from the threat. Guess which approach worked.

At least they got to keep their sweet flag

Should have tried proper COIN with the Scots. Amazing what we learn and then forget in history.

Goodbye is never forever...the Army is too small for that

Today I went into work for the last time. I only spent about an hour there because I only had to sign my leave form and say goodbye to my section. A lot of memories were had in that squadron...some good, some bad. I wouldn't trade anything in the world for that two year experience/adventure.

Not sure if I'm going to change the name of the blog. I wouldn't even know what to change it to.

1-14 CAV S2 section: our success was due entirely to your hard work, dedication, and sacrifice. Our failures were mine alone.

I leave you with a quote from Tom Ricks' blog:

We used to joke that an Iraq year was a like a dog year -- between the fear
and stress, the horrendous climate, the hours worked, and the alcohol, you aged
seven years for every one you spent there.

Other than the alcohol...which is often consumed in large amounts upon redeployment...I agree completely.

Good luck 1-14...

Oh Iraq, it's not you, it's me...and it's complicated

Several incidents in Iraq have caught my eye in the past couple of days. Two of them held my interest because they occured in 1-14's old battlespace; the third was just to the west of our stomping grounds and very much in our "area of interest"; the fourth was an attack in Baghdad which has garnered very little media attention.

I'll start with number three because sometimes you have to mix things up: a suicide bomber struck at a cafe in the town of Balad Ruz last Friday. The media is quick to point the blame on Al Qaida in Iraq but I'm not so sure. Balad Ruz has been relatively quiet since 2009 and while it was once a stronghold for AQI, the organizations control over the area dissipated due to several U.S. operations as well as Iraqi Army units putting a chokehold on the town and the farmland to the south. The Islamic State of Iraq (Al Qaida's name for a new umbrella insurgent group meant to put a more Iraqi face on the foreign dominated AQI) allegedly was formed in Balad Ruz and many of its members were given land in the area. I say "allegedly" because this was told to me by the BDE S2 for 1-25 SBCT so its accuracy is in question and I have seen other sources claim ISI began in the Anbar Province.

Balad Ruz is that spot 1/3 up between Baqubah and Mandali

Violence had also decreased in the town for the same reason, in my opinion anyway, due to the same reason violence dropped in Baghdad. Balad Ruz is a mixed town of Shia and Sunni as well as a good number of Kurds. The sectarian violence of 2006-07 led to internal movements leading to a division of the town. The Shia held the north part of town and the Sunnis held the south. The dividing line was the Baqubah-Mandali road that split the town. With the town now evenly divided there was no more thirst for sectarian violence and security forces were once again able to maintain order. By the time 3-2 SBCT arrived attacks and incidents had dropped to 0-1 attacks a month in Balad Ruz.

The article focuses on the fact that most of the victims of the attack were Shia, barely mentioning that they were Faili Kurds. My assessment of the attack is that it's less an AQI sectarian attack and more an ethnic attack aimed at diminishing Kurdish influence in an area that is somewhat under dispute. The Kurds have been attempting to push their borders and control farther south and west and this attack may have been a reaction to that push.

The attack in Baghdad was a hostage situation at a Christian church. ISI has claimed responsibility for the attack which led to at least 58 people being killed after security forces stormed the church. Two takeaways from this incident: 1) it appeared to be an entirely Iraqi led effort; and not just the "fake" Iraqi led missions where one Iraqi Army soldier is put in a mission planned, led, and manned by a bunch of American special forces soldiers. 2) it was done poorly, but then even the Russians frak things up sometimes.

Finally, the Jalula investigations division chief was killed by an IED on October 27th. This attack was likely a continuation of the attacks against Jalula security forces that have been occuring in the last several months and that I wrote about at the beginning of last month. Interesting note, the attack occured on the road that runs right next to FOB Cobra...d'oh.

In response to this incident, Iraqi security forces detained an individual allegedly in charge of the operation and who was a financier for AQI in the area. The detainment occurred in Sari Tapa, a village just to the west of Qara Tapa which is the northwest of FOB Cobra...where's that handy map...

Qara Tapa is the speck at the very north of the map spelled funny

Here's where things become interesting to me, and likely me alone. The individual detained shares a name very similar to an individual who we were targeting for some time but could never capture due to the remoteness of Sari Tapa and the early warning the individual received whenever we were coming. He was the leader of Jaysh al Islami (JAI) in the Qara Tapa area and we were only really targeting him because the Iraqis were targeting him; both sides only really went after him half heartedly.

The reason for this lackadasical attitude towards this individual was because JAI was no longer a threat in the area and had ceased conducting operations. JAI is a nationalistic organization that formed some time in 2004 or 2005 to fight off who they saw as invaders...us. Since there were very few U.S. troops in the Qara Tapa area in 2005 they targeted the next two logical organizations...Peshmerga who came into the region in 2006 at the behest of Maliki to help with the security situation and AQI who JAI felt was foreign and oppressive. In 2007 war broke out between JAI, AQI, and Ansar al Sunna (Kurdish/Sunni extremists who have a love/hate relationship with AQI). JAI pretty much lost with most of its members joining the newly formed JRTN (Baathist, nationalistic organization formed to fight the occupiers and bring back a Baathist regime). Our target said "fuck this" and quit fighting, content to hang out in Sari Tapa with his attractive wife. He complained constantly to the mukhtar of Sari Tapa reasoning that he never attacked Americans or the Iraqi Army, why was he being targeted. Our response...he had a warrant and in our defense we weren't trying very hard to capture him.

Anyway...if this individual detained for the bombing against the CID chief is our target than one of two things is going on. Either he is being made the scapegoat or he joined AQI and is funding their operations. The more simple explaination is that the individual detained is our targets cousin who if I recall correctly had connections to both AQI and JAI. Problem is, things are never simple in Northeast Diyala. 2-14 CAV, I do not envy you one bit.

If at first you don't succeed, try again, and again, and again, and again

Many times on this blog I have discussed how counterinsurgency is difficult, possibly one of the most difficult endevors a modern military can embark upon...unless you go the Mongolian route which is to just raze everything that stands in your way.

I have also mentioned how challenging it was for 1-14 CAV to conduct targeting and capture key individuals. Many parts of our battlespace were, if not openly hostile, certainly disagreeable to U.S. forces and while most of the population agreed that the people we were targeting were "bad" they rarely assisted us. The security forces were frustrating in that while they could be helpful in occasionally providing information on our targets, and on a couple of occasions even conducting missions against individuals on their own, the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police preferred to target the "low hanging fruit"...people they could capture immediately but who often had little intelligence value on the larger network.

There was also the headache inducing issue of operational security with the local security forces. It wasn't that I believed that many of them were actively assisting the insurgency, there were some, it was that as soon as one jundi or shurta got word that he was doing a mission the next day he was calling all his buddies and his family telling them where he was going and what he was doing. Word would eventually get out allowing time for a target to either hide or get out of town for awhile.

This happened with several of our missions. Sometimes I believe it was our own selves shooting us in the foot. For example, on a mission to capture an IED cell leader it was decided that not only would 1-14 be involved, but the SF team, the Iraqi Army commando company, and an element from the Iraqi Army brigade would all participate. When everyone arrived on the objective the Qara Tapa police were already on scene since they had heard about the mission and wanted in on the action as well. What should have been an effort of perhaps the SF team, the Commando Company, and maybe a platoon from 1-14 turned into a circus of several hundred personnel all stepping on eachother's toes.

The mission wasn't a complete failure. This was early into the deployment and we were still working on a lot of the information and intel that had been passed on from 5-1 CAV and so we were able to use the information gathered to further develop the situation and rule out some individuals and homes we thought may be involved in attacks.

In the next 4 months we would target this individual 5 more times. Each time we would get word that he had returned to his parent's house we'd spin up and conduct some hasty planning, gather up some forces, and head out to the village...only to learn that we had just missed him.

The B troop commander finally decided enough was enough and worked another course of action. He took our target's father aside and told him that if he did not force his son to turn himself in or inform us when his son had returned then B troop would return the next night, and the night after that, for 1000 nights. As he left the house, the commander slapped a Bronco troop sticker on the door (the stickers were leftover from the previous deployment, look like the logo of the Denver Broncos, and were used in 06/07 to mark homes that had been searched. They do not come off easily).

Within a week the target turned himself in to the Qara Tapa police.

Bronco would go on to use this same technique on a few other individuals with varying success. I took away from the situation a valuable lesson in counterinsurgency which is that while force and constant raids don't always work, annoying regularity can. Targeted raids that upset the lives of a single family that are fully aware of a member's guilt will eventually lead to enough annoyance and shame that the family forces the targeted individual to turn himself in. No other enemies were made, the rest of the village was not disturbed, and we no longer bothered this family in any way. After this individual was detained, IEDs in that specific area dropped to zero for approximately four months.

Oil, tribes, ethnic and sectarian conflict...but not Iraq

Intriguing article in the November issue of National Geographic. Unfortunately it's not online so some of you may have to break away from the computer and actually read a real paper and ink magazine.

The article is an overview of the conflict between north and south Sudan and goes into the history and backstory of the issues that led to violence between the two parts of the country and on at least two occasions led to civil war. Most of the time I just look at the pretty pictures in NG but I actually spent the time and read this article. Shocking, I know.

Beginnings of the modern conflict in Sudan can be seen as going back centuries to when Arabs first fanned out from Arabia to conquer land in the name of Islam. In the 600s the Nubians, as the ancient Sudanese were called, fought the Arabs to a standstill. The Ottomans would invade the area again in the 1800s for two reasons: a shit ton of elephants meaning a shit ton of ivory and the large population of African blacks who could be sold into slavery.

In 1899 the British would take over the region in order to maintain control over the Nile River. The Brits ruled south and north Sudan as two regions but put most of their efforts and resources into northern Sudan.

The British Empire slowly withered after WWII and in the 1950s Sudan would gain independence but soon collapse into civil war. The conflict was primarily a fight between the Muslim Arabs in the north where the country is primarily desert and the Christian/Animist blacks in the south where due to the numerous rivers and marshes that feed the Nile a herding economy was the way of life. One more element would fuel the conflict, literally: oil.

I know I've seen something similar...but where?

This map is a bit hard to make out but the orange line is the divide between north and south. The blocks are oil development areas. The red line is the single oil pipeline in the country. Not depicted are the oil refineries, but they are all in the north. Most of the oilfields currently in use are along the border between north and south.

Ok, quick recap. Two different ethnic groups; sectarian differences between the two; large geographic divide; two different economies and cultures; conflict over control of oil resources; majority ethnicity control central government and is attempting to dominate minority ethnicity. This reminds me of someplace...

Ahh yeah, that brings back some memories.

In 2005 the two sides signed a peace agreement that gave the south limited autonomy and also established that in 2011 a vote would be held in south Sudan to determine if the population desires indepedence from the north.

If the vote is actually held and it is determined that the south seeks to be its own nation will Khartoum allow that to happen and watch most of its oil go with it? Will Egpyt be ok with yet another nation controlling the beginnings of the Nile? What will be the reaction of the U.S. and the rest of the world be if violence breaks out on a large scale? Will it be a repeat of the genocide in Darfur where the world sat back, watched it happen, and did nothing?

Afghanistan? That's still going on?

Many times on this blog I have mentioned that Afghanistan is both a place and a conflict that I do not understand, primarily because I have avoided trying to understand it. My attention has been focused on Iraq these past several years primarily because I knew Iraq was where I was going to deploy to. My thoughts on Afghanistan have swayed from, "it's kind of bad there but not as bad as Iraq" up to my more recent thoughts of "holy crap Batman, things are getting bad there, I'm glad I'm in Iraq."

I do know a few things about Afghanistan: it's a tribal society run by warlords; they despise central government and foreign power influence; it doesn't matter if you control Kabul; Kandahar is key.

The city of Kandahar and the province are the spiritual home of the Taliban due to that organization's beginnings in Kandahar. Control Kandahar, and gain the trust and cooperation of the people there, and you are a big step closer to keeping Afghanistan under control...or something like that.

According to Carlotta Gall from the NY Times, coalition forces have had a lot of recent success in the Kandahar Province and have taken the initiative away from the Taliban. Military officials, like usual for counterinsurgency, are being cautiously optimistic. However, it appears the tide may be going our way in that area which means much of Afghanistan may follow. Part of the success, according to the article is the combined civil and military effort; the highly accurate HIMARS rocket system.

Hi! I'm here to welcome you to a world of hurt!

There's certainly a long way to go in Afghanistan and even if the Taliban are defeated in Kandahar, they may easily slip back in after a drawdown of forces. I remain, like many of my military comrades, cautiously optimistic. Perhaps we will actually be able to leave Afghanistan with a little bit of dignity.