"The Iliad is ever mindful that war is about men killing or men killed. In the entire epic, no warrior, whether hero or obscure man of the ranks, dies happily or well. No reward awaits the soldier's valor; no heaven will receive him. The Iliad's words and phrases for the process of death make clear that this is something baneful: dark night covers the dying warrior, hateful darkness claims him; he is robbed of sweet life, his soul goes down to Hades bewailing its fate. Again and again, relentlessly, the Iliad hammers this fact: the death of any warrior is tragic and full of horror. Even in war, death is regrettable."
- Caroline Alexander, The War That Killed Achilles
3-2 SBCT suffered it's first combat related death of the deployment on Saturday. Here's the news blurb:
BAQUBA - A U.S. soldier was killed and two others were wounded on Saturday in an attack on their base in Diyala province, the U.S. military said in a statement.
I'll give my readers one guess as to which base this attack occured on. Sometimes you forgot that there are people out there actively trying to kill you. Low number of attacks will give you a sense of complacency.
Nod to Abu Muqawama for the quote.
Insurgents, counter-insurgents, and my frustrations in dealing with both. Puppies on occasion.
Monday, March 15, 2010
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
It's not much, but it's home...
Here's a pretty good article on 1-14's little base, FOB (formerly COP) Cobra.
Most of the quotes come from the brigade's preventive health officer, CPT Mary Nolan. I like Mary but she states Cobra has never run out of food. Unfortunately on two occasions I have gone to the mess hall only to be turned away because they were out of food. Just one of the hazards of this place you have to live with sometimes.
The best part is where the article describes the toilet conditions. Never again will I complain about a toilet after having to deal with the latrine situation here.
The quote at the end..."It's not ideal, but it is Iraq", also amuses me a bit. CPT Nolan gets to go back to FOB Warhorse after her short trips to Cobra, the rest of us have to live here.
To be honest, I prefer this place over a larger base like Warhorse or Victory/Liberty where I spent my first and a good chunk of my second deployment at. Less distractions and some pretty good war stories, and at least we have the internet. Things could be a lot worse.
Most of the quotes come from the brigade's preventive health officer, CPT Mary Nolan. I like Mary but she states Cobra has never run out of food. Unfortunately on two occasions I have gone to the mess hall only to be turned away because they were out of food. Just one of the hazards of this place you have to live with sometimes.
The best part is where the article describes the toilet conditions. Never again will I complain about a toilet after having to deal with the latrine situation here.
The quote at the end..."It's not ideal, but it is Iraq", also amuses me a bit. CPT Nolan gets to go back to FOB Warhorse after her short trips to Cobra, the rest of us have to live here.
To be honest, I prefer this place over a larger base like Warhorse or Victory/Liberty where I spent my first and a good chunk of my second deployment at. Less distractions and some pretty good war stories, and at least we have the internet. Things could be a lot worse.
Saturday, February 13, 2010
Blog writing when I should be sleeping
This deployment is really flying by for me, it's hard to believe 3-2 SBCT is over 6 months through this third deployment to Iraq. Of course there are many days when I look at the calendar and think "ANOTHER 6 months???"
The entire brigade is extremely busy attempting to do several things at once, all of them hard. Each battalion size element is attempting to do more with less in an area that is the size of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts combined.
1-23 IN, the Tomahawks, are attempting to eliminate a very stubborn and very dangerous Jaysh Al Mahdi network in the southern portion of their operating environment while trying to keep villages along two river valleys from going back under control of Al Qaida in Iraq.
2-3 IN, the Patriots, have an extremely complex operating environment along the Diyala River Valley. They are attempting to clean up an area that is several dozen villages sitting along a sectarian divide that could break out into bloody conflict similar to '06-'07.
5-20 IN, the Regulars, are taking on the task of ensuring the Iraqi Security Forces in Baqubah keep order as well as have the potential hotspots of Kanaan and Balad Ruz (birthplace of the Islamic State of Iraq) as well as a good chunk of the Iraq/Iran border.
1-37 FA, the Red Lions, shifted completely from what they trained for and are essentially partnering with Provincial Reconstruction Teams to overwatch projects and keep the money flowing.
1-14 CAV, Warhorse, overworked, overstretched, and always seeking to do more. We are the Brigade's main effort as we deal with 75% of the border, tribal conflict and paramount sheikh dispute in a large tribal region, a persistant and "last bastion" Al Qaida safe haven, and have the pleasure of manning a series of "combined checkpoints" manned by Iraqi Army, Peshmerga militia, and US soldiers. These checkpoints are meant as a stop gap measure to keep civil war at bay while the politicians in Baghdad attempt to solve the issue of where Kurdistan actually begins.
What else is my Squadron doing? Well catching this guy for example. How important is this catch? Not as important as the press release would make it seem, but still a big catch.
A sense of accomplishment and relief rolls over you when a high value target is captured. However there is also that question in the back of your mind, "will this capture accomplish anything?"
Time will tell.
The entire brigade is extremely busy attempting to do several things at once, all of them hard. Each battalion size element is attempting to do more with less in an area that is the size of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts combined.
1-23 IN, the Tomahawks, are attempting to eliminate a very stubborn and very dangerous Jaysh Al Mahdi network in the southern portion of their operating environment while trying to keep villages along two river valleys from going back under control of Al Qaida in Iraq.
2-3 IN, the Patriots, have an extremely complex operating environment along the Diyala River Valley. They are attempting to clean up an area that is several dozen villages sitting along a sectarian divide that could break out into bloody conflict similar to '06-'07.
5-20 IN, the Regulars, are taking on the task of ensuring the Iraqi Security Forces in Baqubah keep order as well as have the potential hotspots of Kanaan and Balad Ruz (birthplace of the Islamic State of Iraq) as well as a good chunk of the Iraq/Iran border.
1-37 FA, the Red Lions, shifted completely from what they trained for and are essentially partnering with Provincial Reconstruction Teams to overwatch projects and keep the money flowing.
1-14 CAV, Warhorse, overworked, overstretched, and always seeking to do more. We are the Brigade's main effort as we deal with 75% of the border, tribal conflict and paramount sheikh dispute in a large tribal region, a persistant and "last bastion" Al Qaida safe haven, and have the pleasure of manning a series of "combined checkpoints" manned by Iraqi Army, Peshmerga militia, and US soldiers. These checkpoints are meant as a stop gap measure to keep civil war at bay while the politicians in Baghdad attempt to solve the issue of where Kurdistan actually begins.
What else is my Squadron doing? Well catching this guy for example. How important is this catch? Not as important as the press release would make it seem, but still a big catch.
A sense of accomplishment and relief rolls over you when a high value target is captured. However there is also that question in the back of your mind, "will this capture accomplish anything?"
Time will tell.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Worst blogger ever...
To the few loyal readers that I have, I apologize. There has been a serious lack in blogs in about a month and a half. I do have a very good reason for this:
No, it's not because I am too busy. Those who visit Facebook know that I am on there quite regularly.
The problem was that despite having commercial internet in the office, I could not access the site to update this blog. I could read my own blog, I just couldn't update it.
I'm also too lazy to walk to the MWR to update my blog there.
I will hopefully post something more indepth later. My squadron has been hard at work catching bad guys, manning tripartite checkpoints, and enjoying USO shows with the Houston Texan cheerleaders.
No, it's not because I am too busy. Those who visit Facebook know that I am on there quite regularly.
The problem was that despite having commercial internet in the office, I could not access the site to update this blog. I could read my own blog, I just couldn't update it.
I'm also too lazy to walk to the MWR to update my blog there.
I will hopefully post something more indepth later. My squadron has been hard at work catching bad guys, manning tripartite checkpoints, and enjoying USO shows with the Houston Texan cheerleaders.
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
There is no black and white...only shades of gray.
It is rare that one gets to see the lessons of counter insurgency (COIN for you civilians reading at home) while deployed in a COIN environment. That may seem odd since we are conducting daily COIN operations here in Diyala, but what I am getting at is that you rarely, if ever, see it up close and blantantly obvious.
In a standard deployment, towards the end anyway, you may see a drop in attacks or a more friendly attitude towards your patrols if you conduct proper COIN by assisting the economy, fixing or upgrading the infrastructure, meeting with local leaders to discuss their needs, etc. You may even see the benefits after only a few months of COIN operations. On the opposite spectrum, if you operate in the area like you own it, break things, disrupt people's lives, are generally hostile and agressive, etc...you will eventually see an increase in attacks, a hostile attitude (the look of pure hatred is quite an interesting look), and a far from professional attitude from your local security partners.
However, on occasion, you get to experience a COIN lesson in a single moment. One of those situations where you think to yourself..."crikey, we really screwed this one up."
There is a certain individual who my squadron has been targeting almost since we got here. An interesting note, my brigade was actually targeting him last deployment as well, during our lovely adventure up to Baqubah in '07. He's the one guy I wanted to take down before we left...
...he was recently captured in Baghdad...and there was much rejoicing.
The rejoicing was tempered a bit when I learned why he become an insurgent/terrorist/criminal, which he was (murderer, extortionist, intimidator). He claims that he began attacking Americans back in 2004 when his father, aunt, and a few other family members were killed by Americans. Our heavy hand made this man an insurgent.
Had we used proper COIN back in 2004, or at the very least been less trigger happy, this man's family likely would still be alive. This man would likely not have begun attacking Americans. How many other men am I targeting are wanted only because we forced them to be wanted men? How much of this is our fault?
I almost feel sorry for the man, hell, he's about my age...I would probably have started attacking us too if put in his situation.
But we all make choices...he made his and I made mine.
In a standard deployment, towards the end anyway, you may see a drop in attacks or a more friendly attitude towards your patrols if you conduct proper COIN by assisting the economy, fixing or upgrading the infrastructure, meeting with local leaders to discuss their needs, etc. You may even see the benefits after only a few months of COIN operations. On the opposite spectrum, if you operate in the area like you own it, break things, disrupt people's lives, are generally hostile and agressive, etc...you will eventually see an increase in attacks, a hostile attitude (the look of pure hatred is quite an interesting look), and a far from professional attitude from your local security partners.
However, on occasion, you get to experience a COIN lesson in a single moment. One of those situations where you think to yourself..."crikey, we really screwed this one up."
There is a certain individual who my squadron has been targeting almost since we got here. An interesting note, my brigade was actually targeting him last deployment as well, during our lovely adventure up to Baqubah in '07. He's the one guy I wanted to take down before we left...
...he was recently captured in Baghdad...and there was much rejoicing.
The rejoicing was tempered a bit when I learned why he become an insurgent/terrorist/criminal, which he was (murderer, extortionist, intimidator). He claims that he began attacking Americans back in 2004 when his father, aunt, and a few other family members were killed by Americans. Our heavy hand made this man an insurgent.
Had we used proper COIN back in 2004, or at the very least been less trigger happy, this man's family likely would still be alive. This man would likely not have begun attacking Americans. How many other men am I targeting are wanted only because we forced them to be wanted men? How much of this is our fault?
I almost feel sorry for the man, hell, he's about my age...I would probably have started attacking us too if put in his situation.
But we all make choices...he made his and I made mine.
Monday, December 7, 2009
No attractive cheerleaders though...
There is a side of Iraq that I thought I would never get to see, a situation that would be present long after I stopped coming to the place...normalcy.
In 1-14 CAV we have a yearly tradition around Thanksgiving, the Turkey Bowl. Each Troop puts together a football team or two and a tournament is held with the winners getting a large trophy. The Squadron Commander of course wasn't about to let this tradition slip by just because we were in Iraq so on Thanksgiving football was played on both COP COBRA and FOB CALDWELL between cavalry troops, engineers, and Marine military training teams. Victors were declared and the championship game was held that Saturday...
...at a sports stadium...
...in Khanaqin.
That's right, we played the championship game in an Iraqi city with no issues and no attacks. I never thought I would see the day. There is now an American football in the display case of the Khanaqin Stadium symbolizing the first ever American football game played there. Feels good to be a part of something like that.
In 1-14 CAV we have a yearly tradition around Thanksgiving, the Turkey Bowl. Each Troop puts together a football team or two and a tournament is held with the winners getting a large trophy. The Squadron Commander of course wasn't about to let this tradition slip by just because we were in Iraq so on Thanksgiving football was played on both COP COBRA and FOB CALDWELL between cavalry troops, engineers, and Marine military training teams. Victors were declared and the championship game was held that Saturday...
...at a sports stadium...
...in Khanaqin.
That's right, we played the championship game in an Iraqi city with no issues and no attacks. I never thought I would see the day. There is now an American football in the display case of the Khanaqin Stadium symbolizing the first ever American football game played there. Feels good to be a part of something like that.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
A leader's worst nightmare becomes reality...
In May 2004 I sat in SEATAC airport waiting for my flight to Baltimore and utimately Iraq. It was my first deployment and one of the primary thoughts was what would I do if one of my soldiers died.
Late June 2006 beginning my second deployment I had the same thought...what am I going to do if one of my soldiers dies?
July 2009 that same thought inched its way forward into my mind.
4 November 2009 I suddenly had to face the question. My human intelligence collection NCO, SSG Amy Tirador, was found dead of non combat related injuries on FOB Caldwell.
SSG Tirador had joined the Army as a medic and had saved a soldier's life during her first deployment in 2004. She changed MOS's and become an intelligence NCO and soon joined 3-2 SBCT where she was assigned to the 209th MICO. During the deployment she was attached to 1-14 CAV and my section as my human intelligence collection NCO.
I still don't have an answer to that question I feared to face. Sometimes life punches you in the face and it takes a little while to get up. Thousands of miles away from my usual support structure it may take me awhile.
Late June 2006 beginning my second deployment I had the same thought...what am I going to do if one of my soldiers dies?
July 2009 that same thought inched its way forward into my mind.
4 November 2009 I suddenly had to face the question. My human intelligence collection NCO, SSG Amy Tirador, was found dead of non combat related injuries on FOB Caldwell.
SSG Tirador had joined the Army as a medic and had saved a soldier's life during her first deployment in 2004. She changed MOS's and become an intelligence NCO and soon joined 3-2 SBCT where she was assigned to the 209th MICO. During the deployment she was attached to 1-14 CAV and my section as my human intelligence collection NCO.
I still don't have an answer to that question I feared to face. Sometimes life punches you in the face and it takes a little while to get up. Thousands of miles away from my usual support structure it may take me awhile.
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