Just in case you haven't been paying attention Tunisia recently had an uprising which ousted the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime. This "Jasmine Revolution" has since spread to other nations such as Algeria, Yemen, and Egypt. Currently, the Egyptian government appears to be the most vulnerable and has cut off the internet, set a curfew, and brought in the army.
I have two concerns right now. The first is my usual concern that people in this country will view the use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter by the protesters and think these protesters are like them and think like them. Just because a group of people uses the same website you do does not indicate that they want the same things; i.e., the revolution may not be attempting to establish a liberal democracy. 1979 Iranian Revolution come to mind?
The second concern is that the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian Islamic Fundamentalist organization tied to Al Qaida, is supporting the protesters. I fear either a fundamentalist Islamic regime friendly to Al Qaida being emplaced or several new insurgencies created by these revolutions.
While I do not like dictatorships, the evil that I know is far better than the evil that I do not know.
Friday, January 28, 2011
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Updated: Seriously, I just need to let Diyala go
Update: because I'm an idiot who doesn't check his notes before posting...
Below is a cut a paste of my previous post about an Iraqi source naming the most dangerous groups in Diyala Province. Mentioned was the al Awda Party, which I confused with the al Hadba Party. Awda is fairly dangerous due to it being made up almost entirely of former Baath Party members but I've never known them to conduct attacks in Diyala. I wouldn't even have known them to exist in 1-14 Cav's operating environment except for a troop commander who claimed they were in As Sadiyah and Jalula and were trying to run party members in the election of 2010...which I think he was actually wrong about.
So I apologize for the mix up. My goal is to be as accurate as possible and I'll be sure to check my notes from now on. Everything else is as accurate as I can remember.
An interesting article today from Aswat al Iraq. If the link doesn't work it is because the site is currently experiencing server problems which normally are not an issue.
Aswat al Iraq is a news agency in Iraq that was created in 2004 and does a fairly decent job of reporting the news in Iraq.
The article is a quick report of three armed organizations that a "security source" believes pose the greatest threat in Diyala Province. Those three groups are Ansar al Sunna (AAS), al Naqshabandia (JRTN), and the al Awda political party.
Now, I fully realize that I have been away from Diyala for 6 months now (that long really? Time really flys) but unless events have radically changed in the province I have serious issue with that statement. The only group I agree with is JRTN, and it surprises me that this source would admit JRTN is a threat.
JRTN is a fairly secret organization whose leadership is primarily made up of former high ranking military officers and Baath Party members. Their entire information campaign is that they only attack US forces and their goal is the removal of the US military from Iraq and then an establishment of a Baathist regime as the Iraqi government. While our Iraqi counterparts fully admitted the existence of JRTN and worked with us to remove the leadership, they rarely stated in public that JRTN was much of a threat and every time we detained a JRTN leader we had to fight tooth and nail to keep them detained. Either Iraqi authorities are beginning to realize that JRTN should be a focus or this source was Shia who already recognized that JRTN, a primarily Sunni group, was a potential threat to the current Shia dominated government.
The listing of Ansar al Sunna makes me laugh. AAS was all but eliminated as a viable threat in Diyala over the last few years. There were a couple of cells in Baqubah and reports of limited activity in the Tibij region just west of Jalula in 1-14 Cav's area but for the most part they lacked funds, weapons, and personnel. The activity they were reported to be conducted was kidnapping for ransom...a tactic used when a group has no outside funding and needs quick cash. The AAS boogeyman was normally trotted out as a red herring in an attempt to distract US forces or put out disinformation, for whatever reason. This was done a couple of weeks after the Jalula carbomb that killed 2 soldiers in July '10. After my section had laid out those responsible for the attack with the help of C troop and a few of those we believed were responsible had been captured, Kurdish leadership began reporting that AAS was actually to blame and pointed fingers at Arab miliary leaders as ordering the attack. Those leaders being the head of the Jalula Emergency Response Force and the 4th Brigade Intelligence Officer (my partner). It was, in my opinion, political maneuvering only but they managed to convince both the A and B troop commanders.
Mentioning the Awda Party as an armed threat baffles me a bit but doesn't surprise me. The Awda Party is a Sunni political party that was formed in the Ninewa Province became extremely powerful because they run a pro Arab anti Kurd platform, a platform that reminds me of the platform of some Neo Nazi organizations that claim they are not "anti black" they are just "pro white". They showed up in Diyala around September '09 with one of the leaders being the former mayor of As Sadiyah who was the political rival to the current mayor...who was Kurdish.
Awda operates exclusively in Arab-Kurd contested areas and in the Ninewa Province the party was so inflammitory that violence has broken out, mainly when the provincial governor (Awda Party member) attempts to force visit villages that are clearly controlled by the Kurds. Our squadron commander viewed the group as good for democracy in the region as it gave the local Sunni Arabs a voice and the group would work to put Sunni Arab interests on the table. I viewed them as a potential spark in the ethnic powder keg of the Hamrin Area Combined Security Area. While as far as I know, no violence was caused by the party while we were there it's possible the group has armed itself and my be acting as militia to counter Kurdish influence.
Interesting to note is the lack of groups mentioned. No mention of Al Qaida who conducts the majority of the spectacular attacks in the province and no mention of Jaysh al Mahdi or the Jaysh al Mahdi Special Group. Not totally surprised JAM or JAM SG aren't mentioned since they only attack Americans but they were the organizations primarily responsible for the sectarian violence of the past along with AQI. Give the group an inch and they'll take the Province. Not mentioning AQI may indicate that even the Iraqis believe AQI is all but dead in the area, potentially a good sign...or burying heads in the sand.
Monday, January 24, 2011
Just because the idea is crazy, doesn't mean it isn't correct
As the old saying goes, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." I fully believe this statement when it comes to international policy and certain nations aligning with seemlingly odd partners. Take for example Iran and Venezuela, WWII's Germany and Japan, and Iran and Al Qaida.
Wait...what?
I believe I've blogged about Iran and Al Qaida before, I made a hint at a possible partnership towards the end of this post, and I may have written about it more extensively in other posts...but I'm too lazy to try to sift through and find it.
Anyway, I'll provide a brief and simplistic description of a possible Iran/Al Qaida partnership and why some people find it absurd:
Al Qaida is a primarily Sunni organization whose goal is removal of US forces from the Middle East, destruction of corrupt Arab governments, defeat of Shia dominated Arab governments, establishment of an Islamic Caliphate uniting the Islamic world, bankruptcy of the West, and finally, military defeat of the West.
Iran, being a Shia dominated country with a Shia dominated government, should feel threatened by Al Qaida and seek its elimination along with other jihadist organizations that threaten Iran; and to an extent they do. A little known fact was that Iran quietly approved of the US/NATO invasion of Afghanistan to eliminate the Taliban and remove the Al Qaida threat because both organizations were a destabalizing and threatening presence on Iran's eastern border.
However, with the invasion of Iraq there soon grew a very large and potentially threatening American military presence on both Iran's western and eastern border. I can only guess, but I assume that the Iranian leadership saw this development and determined that in order to prevent the US from invading they must keep us as busy as possible in both Afghanistan and Iraq, not too busy so that we would depart immediately and leave two very unstable countries bordering Iran, but but busy enough that we would be too distracted to even think about invading Iran as well.
There were some indications that Iran allowed Al Qaida members to pass through Iran to get from Afghanistan to Iraq, where they were welcomed by the terrorist organization Ansar al Islam. The Shia militia Jaysh al Mahdi leadership was given training in both Iran and Lebanon (training conducted by Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran). Weapons and the ugliest of all IEDs, the EFP, were smuggled from Iran into Iraq.
Most people assumed that Iran would not help Al Qaida and their Iraqi franchise, Al Qaida in Iraq, due to AQ's stated goal of removing Shia governments. However, the first two goals of AQ likely appeal to Iran; removal of US forces from the Middle East and destruction of corrupt Arab governments, many of whom, namely Saudi Arabia, are rivals of Iran. It seems reasonable to me that Iran would assist AQI, namely with limited safe haven and some weapons, especially after it became clear that AQI in no way could defeat the new Iraqi government, but could still hurt US forces in the country. As I mentioned in my post linked above, there were indications of Iranian involvement in three suicide attacks targeting 3-2 SBCT towards the end of the deployment.
Now former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has linked Iran and Al Qaida during a testimony to the Iraq Inquiry. These are essentially the same statements made by Senator John McCain back in 2008. Statements that he was mocked for. Perhaps those sitting in their comfy offices and who have never been to Iraq or Afghanistan do not have a full grasp of the situation or the realities on the ground.
Do not underestimate a nation that perceives itself as surrounded. They are likely to seek allies you would not expect.
Wait...what?
I believe I've blogged about Iran and Al Qaida before, I made a hint at a possible partnership towards the end of this post, and I may have written about it more extensively in other posts...but I'm too lazy to try to sift through and find it.
Anyway, I'll provide a brief and simplistic description of a possible Iran/Al Qaida partnership and why some people find it absurd:
Al Qaida is a primarily Sunni organization whose goal is removal of US forces from the Middle East, destruction of corrupt Arab governments, defeat of Shia dominated Arab governments, establishment of an Islamic Caliphate uniting the Islamic world, bankruptcy of the West, and finally, military defeat of the West.
Iran, being a Shia dominated country with a Shia dominated government, should feel threatened by Al Qaida and seek its elimination along with other jihadist organizations that threaten Iran; and to an extent they do. A little known fact was that Iran quietly approved of the US/NATO invasion of Afghanistan to eliminate the Taliban and remove the Al Qaida threat because both organizations were a destabalizing and threatening presence on Iran's eastern border.
However, with the invasion of Iraq there soon grew a very large and potentially threatening American military presence on both Iran's western and eastern border. I can only guess, but I assume that the Iranian leadership saw this development and determined that in order to prevent the US from invading they must keep us as busy as possible in both Afghanistan and Iraq, not too busy so that we would depart immediately and leave two very unstable countries bordering Iran, but but busy enough that we would be too distracted to even think about invading Iran as well.
There were some indications that Iran allowed Al Qaida members to pass through Iran to get from Afghanistan to Iraq, where they were welcomed by the terrorist organization Ansar al Islam. The Shia militia Jaysh al Mahdi leadership was given training in both Iran and Lebanon (training conducted by Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran). Weapons and the ugliest of all IEDs, the EFP, were smuggled from Iran into Iraq.
Most people assumed that Iran would not help Al Qaida and their Iraqi franchise, Al Qaida in Iraq, due to AQ's stated goal of removing Shia governments. However, the first two goals of AQ likely appeal to Iran; removal of US forces from the Middle East and destruction of corrupt Arab governments, many of whom, namely Saudi Arabia, are rivals of Iran. It seems reasonable to me that Iran would assist AQI, namely with limited safe haven and some weapons, especially after it became clear that AQI in no way could defeat the new Iraqi government, but could still hurt US forces in the country. As I mentioned in my post linked above, there were indications of Iranian involvement in three suicide attacks targeting 3-2 SBCT towards the end of the deployment.
Now former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has linked Iran and Al Qaida during a testimony to the Iraq Inquiry. These are essentially the same statements made by Senator John McCain back in 2008. Statements that he was mocked for. Perhaps those sitting in their comfy offices and who have never been to Iraq or Afghanistan do not have a full grasp of the situation or the realities on the ground.
Do not underestimate a nation that perceives itself as surrounded. They are likely to seek allies you would not expect.
Sunday, January 23, 2011
Movers and shakers
A couple interesting of events in Iraq the past couple of days that I would like to highlight.
The first, Shia cleric and annoying fellow Muqtada al Sadr returned to Iran after coming back to Iraq following a 4 year study in Qom, Iran. "Uncle Mookie", as we referred to him back in '06-'07, created or at the very least co-opted the violent Jaysh al Mahdi militia but left for Iran to study theology in the hopes of becoming an ayatollah. He returned to Iraq earlier this month after Prime Minister Maliki began forming the government.
I am no means an expert in the larger politics of Iraq or the Shia in general as a majority of my last two deployments have been Sunni threat focused, but I do have to wonder about this back and forth movement. Did al Sadr show up to try to sway or possibly control Maliki? Was he there to deliver a warning? Or did he believe it was safe to come back only to be told to find his way back to Qom, perhaps by the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani himself who does not want Sadr causing more problems?
The other interesting development is the founder of Ansar al Islam has said he wishes to return to Iraq. Ansar al Islam is a terrorist organization that operated in Kurdish Iraq during the late '90s up to the invasion. The group attacked Kurdish targets in an attempt to form an Islamic Caliphate-type government in the region. After the US-led invasion the group assisted foreign fighters and Al Qaida in entering the country and soon changed its name to Ansar al Sunna and spred its influence into much of northern and central Iraq. AAI/AAS worked on an off with AQI, sometimes working towards the common goal and sometimes in violent conflict with the other organization.
Mullah Krekar's desire to leave Norway may just be due to pressure from Norwegian authorities, afterall there is a great quote in the article from the Norwegian foreign minister who states "Nothing would please us more", referencing Mr. Krekar's leaving. However, there may be more to the situation. In my last post I mentioned that an Iraqi security source claimed AAS was one of the three primary armed threats in Diyala Province. Is AAS gaining power and influence due to the perceived weakness of AQI? Is Mullah Krekar's desire to return to Iraq a desire to lead his organization once again?
It's probably the Norwegian food driving him away.
The first, Shia cleric and annoying fellow Muqtada al Sadr returned to Iran after coming back to Iraq following a 4 year study in Qom, Iran. "Uncle Mookie", as we referred to him back in '06-'07, created or at the very least co-opted the violent Jaysh al Mahdi militia but left for Iran to study theology in the hopes of becoming an ayatollah. He returned to Iraq earlier this month after Prime Minister Maliki began forming the government.
I am no means an expert in the larger politics of Iraq or the Shia in general as a majority of my last two deployments have been Sunni threat focused, but I do have to wonder about this back and forth movement. Did al Sadr show up to try to sway or possibly control Maliki? Was he there to deliver a warning? Or did he believe it was safe to come back only to be told to find his way back to Qom, perhaps by the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani himself who does not want Sadr causing more problems?
The other interesting development is the founder of Ansar al Islam has said he wishes to return to Iraq. Ansar al Islam is a terrorist organization that operated in Kurdish Iraq during the late '90s up to the invasion. The group attacked Kurdish targets in an attempt to form an Islamic Caliphate-type government in the region. After the US-led invasion the group assisted foreign fighters and Al Qaida in entering the country and soon changed its name to Ansar al Sunna and spred its influence into much of northern and central Iraq. AAI/AAS worked on an off with AQI, sometimes working towards the common goal and sometimes in violent conflict with the other organization.
Mullah Krekar's desire to leave Norway may just be due to pressure from Norwegian authorities, afterall there is a great quote in the article from the Norwegian foreign minister who states "Nothing would please us more", referencing Mr. Krekar's leaving. However, there may be more to the situation. In my last post I mentioned that an Iraqi security source claimed AAS was one of the three primary armed threats in Diyala Province. Is AAS gaining power and influence due to the perceived weakness of AQI? Is Mullah Krekar's desire to return to Iraq a desire to lead his organization once again?
It's probably the Norwegian food driving him away.
Saturday, January 22, 2011
Seriously, I just need to let Diyala go
An interesting article today from Aswat al Iraq. If the link doesn't work it is because the site is currently experiencing server problems which normally are not an issue.
Aswat al Iraq is a news agency in Iraq that was created in 2004 and does a fairly decent job of reporting the news in Iraq.
The article is a quick report of three armed organizations that a "security source" believes pose the greatest threat in Diyala Province. Those three groups are Ansar al Sunna (AAS), al Naqshabandia (JRTN), and the al Awda political party.
Now, I fully realize that I have been away from Diyala for 6 months now (that long really? Time really flys) but unless events have radically changed in the province I have serious issue with that statement. The only group I agree with is JRTN, and it surprises me that this source would admit JRTN is a threat.
JRTN is a fairly secret organization whose leadership is primarily made up of former high ranking military officers and Baath Party members. Their entire information campaign is that they only attack US forces and their goal is the removal of the US military from Iraq and then an establishment of a Baathist regime as the Iraqi government. While our Iraqi counterparts fully admitted the existence of JRTN and worked with us to remove the leadership, they rarely stated in public that JRTN was much of a threat and every time we detained a JRTN leader we had to fight tooth and nail to keep them detained. Either Iraqi authorities are beginning to realize that JRTN should be a focus or this source was Shia who already recognized that JRTN, a primarily Sunni group, was a potential threat to the current Shia dominated government.
The listing of Ansar al Sunna makes me laugh. AAS was all but eliminated as a viable threat in Diyala over the last few years. There were a couple of cells in Baqubah and reports of limited activity in the Tibij region just west of Jalula in 1-14 Cav's area but for the most part they lacked funds, weapons, and personnel. The activity they were reported to be conducted was kidnapping for ransom...a tactic used when a group has no outside funding and needs quick cash. The AAS boogeyman was normally trotted out as a red herring in an attempt to distract US forces or put out disinformation, for whatever reason. This was done a couple of weeks after the Jalula carbomb that killed 2 soldiers in July '10. After my section had laid out those responsible for the attack with the help of C troop and a few of those we believed were responsible had been captured, Kurdish leadership began reporting that AAS was actually to blame and pointed fingers at Arab miliary leaders as ordering the attack. Those leaders being the head of the Jalula Emergency Response Force and the 4th Brigade Intelligence Officer (my partner). It was, in my opinion, political maneuvering only but they managed to convince both the A and B troop commanders.
Mentioning the Awda Party as an armed threat baffles me a bit but doesn't surprise me. The Awda Party is a Sunni political party that was formed in the Ninewa Province became extremely powerful because they run a pro Arab anti Kurd platform, a platform that reminds me of the platform of some Neo Nazi organizations that claim they are not "anti black" they are just "pro white". They showed up in Diyala around September '09 with one of the leaders being the former mayor of As Sadiyah who was the political rival to the current mayor...who was Kurdish.
Awda operates exclusively in Arab-Kurd contested areas and in the Ninewa Province the party was so inflammitory that violence has broken out, mainly when the provincial governor (Awda Party member) attempts to force visit villages that are clearly controlled by the Kurds. Our squadron commander viewed the group as good for democracy in the region as it gave the local Sunni Arabs a voice and the group would work to put Sunni Arab interests on the table. I viewed them as a potential spark in the ethnic powder keg of the Hamrin Area Combined Security Area. While as far as I know, no violence was caused by the party while we were there it's possible the group has armed itself and my be acting as militia to counter Kurdish influence.
Interesting to note is the lack of groups mentioned. No mention of Al Qaida who conducts the majority of the spectacular attacks in the province and no mention of Jaysh al Mahdi or the Jaysh al Mahdi Special Group. Not totally surprised JAM or JAM SG aren't mentioned since they only attack Americans but they were the organizations primarily responsible for the sectarian violence of the past along with AQI. Give the group an inch and they'll take the Province. Not mentioning AQI may indicate that even the Iraqis believe AQI is all but dead in the area, potentially a good sign...or burying heads in the sand.
Aswat al Iraq is a news agency in Iraq that was created in 2004 and does a fairly decent job of reporting the news in Iraq.
The article is a quick report of three armed organizations that a "security source" believes pose the greatest threat in Diyala Province. Those three groups are Ansar al Sunna (AAS), al Naqshabandia (JRTN), and the al Awda political party.
Now, I fully realize that I have been away from Diyala for 6 months now (that long really? Time really flys) but unless events have radically changed in the province I have serious issue with that statement. The only group I agree with is JRTN, and it surprises me that this source would admit JRTN is a threat.
JRTN is a fairly secret organization whose leadership is primarily made up of former high ranking military officers and Baath Party members. Their entire information campaign is that they only attack US forces and their goal is the removal of the US military from Iraq and then an establishment of a Baathist regime as the Iraqi government. While our Iraqi counterparts fully admitted the existence of JRTN and worked with us to remove the leadership, they rarely stated in public that JRTN was much of a threat and every time we detained a JRTN leader we had to fight tooth and nail to keep them detained. Either Iraqi authorities are beginning to realize that JRTN should be a focus or this source was Shia who already recognized that JRTN, a primarily Sunni group, was a potential threat to the current Shia dominated government.
The listing of Ansar al Sunna makes me laugh. AAS was all but eliminated as a viable threat in Diyala over the last few years. There were a couple of cells in Baqubah and reports of limited activity in the Tibij region just west of Jalula in 1-14 Cav's area but for the most part they lacked funds, weapons, and personnel. The activity they were reported to be conducted was kidnapping for ransom...a tactic used when a group has no outside funding and needs quick cash. The AAS boogeyman was normally trotted out as a red herring in an attempt to distract US forces or put out disinformation, for whatever reason. This was done a couple of weeks after the Jalula carbomb that killed 2 soldiers in July '10. After my section had laid out those responsible for the attack with the help of C troop and a few of those we believed were responsible had been captured, Kurdish leadership began reporting that AAS was actually to blame and pointed fingers at Arab miliary leaders as ordering the attack. Those leaders being the head of the Jalula Emergency Response Force and the 4th Brigade Intelligence Officer (my partner). It was, in my opinion, political maneuvering only but they managed to convince both the A and B troop commanders.
Mentioning the Awda Party as an armed threat baffles me a bit but doesn't surprise me. The Awda Party is a Sunni political party that was formed in the Ninewa Province became extremely powerful because they run a pro Arab anti Kurd platform, a platform that reminds me of the platform of some Neo Nazi organizations that claim they are not "anti black" they are just "pro white". They showed up in Diyala around September '09 with one of the leaders being the former mayor of As Sadiyah who was the political rival to the current mayor...who was Kurdish.
Awda operates exclusively in Arab-Kurd contested areas and in the Ninewa Province the party was so inflammitory that violence has broken out, mainly when the provincial governor (Awda Party member) attempts to force visit villages that are clearly controlled by the Kurds. Our squadron commander viewed the group as good for democracy in the region as it gave the local Sunni Arabs a voice and the group would work to put Sunni Arab interests on the table. I viewed them as a potential spark in the ethnic powder keg of the Hamrin Area Combined Security Area. While as far as I know, no violence was caused by the party while we were there it's possible the group has armed itself and my be acting as militia to counter Kurdish influence.
Interesting to note is the lack of groups mentioned. No mention of Al Qaida who conducts the majority of the spectacular attacks in the province and no mention of Jaysh al Mahdi or the Jaysh al Mahdi Special Group. Not totally surprised JAM or JAM SG aren't mentioned since they only attack Americans but they were the organizations primarily responsible for the sectarian violence of the past along with AQI. Give the group an inch and they'll take the Province. Not mentioning AQI may indicate that even the Iraqis believe AQI is all but dead in the area, potentially a good sign...or burying heads in the sand.
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
The Google Machine as an intel tool
Open source intelligence, in my opinion (of course it's my opinion, it's my blog), is one of the best and most under utilized of the intelligence collection functions. OSINT as it is known in the intelligence community, is the process of collecting information from publicly available resources such as newspapers, magazines, the internet, etc.
The other "int's" (SIGINT, HUMINT, etc) often receive far more attention in training and in the field despite the vast amount of data that can be gleamed from open source. All too often commanders, executive officers, and S2's (myself included) demand intelligence collection and analysis be done using the other "int's" as well as the government's secure internet server when a couple hours on 'Google' may give the same, if not better, results.
The Army devotes entire MOS's and weeks long courses to the other intelligence functions but very little focus is given to OSINT; perhaps one class of a couple of hours duration at best. More time and effort should be spent teaching the value and resources that can be used of open source.
I bring this all up because at the moment I'm remembering a situation 1-14 Cav faced this last deployment in which OSINT assisted in helping.
We had a rather problematic JRTN cell (or cells, I'll probably never know) that liked to hit our Strykers with command wire and victim initiated IEDs on the main route from Jalula to Qara Tapa. B Troop rectified the problem initially by detaining two of the key individuals we believed were responsible for the attacks and Special Forces rounded up a third. This helped for a few months but unfortunately two of the detained men were eventually released and IEDs became a problem again a couple of months after their release.
The B Troop commander, always looking for a fight, was not too upset by the attacks because they never caused any damage or injury with the exception of the occasional busted tire or mild concussion. He began his own little information operations (IO) campaign in an attempt to cause the JRTN cell to make a mistake and get themselves caught. Whenever one of the local leaders in the area commented on the attacks, Bronco 6 would mention that he was glad the IEDs were hitting his vehicles as opposed to the police, Iraqi Army, or civilians because if the IEDs went off on Strykers, no damage would be caused and no one would get hurt. It was his way of saying to the insurgents "keep it up dirtbags, you suck at it anyway."
I fully understand, as did the B troop commander, that we were getting hit because we had established patterns on that particular route. It was the quickest road from FOB Cobra to two of the combined checkpoints that were manned by B troop. The insurgents knew that we would use that road often and consistently. All they had to do was wait for a convoy of Strykers to go by, knowing that in a couple of hours those same Strykers (or the Strykers those Strykers were replacing) would come right back down that road. I made a large assumption that the individuals who planted the IED were likely still in the area filming the attack because that's what JRTN did for both propaganda purposes and for proof of the attack to get paid.
But where were those individuals hiding?
The answer would come late in the deployment from a weekly product created by an organization not affliated with my brigade. The product was a rollup of the messages, videos, and propaganda posted on the internet by the different insurgent organizations operating in Iraq. I found myself on the contact list for this product when I discovered a friend of mine, who had gotten out of the Army, was in theatre working as a contractor and I noticed her name at the beginning of an email chain. She in turn sent me this product weekly which happened to be made by a guy I went to the career course with...another under utilized intel tool, networking, remember, it's a small Army.
Back to the point...on one of the products was a link to a website that showed an attack against an American Army vehicle somewhere in Diyala Province. The website was a JRTN site and since my squadron was the only one with a JRTN problem so I figured this had to be one of our attacks. The site even mentioned which cell conducted the attack, 2nd platoon / 2nd company / 101st brigade (JRTN names its cells in a military manner). I passed off the link to B troop who then went out to the site and based off the video were able to determine exactly where it was filmed from.
Thanks to open source and the internet, we now knew the location of where insurgents were filming the attacks as well as confirmed our suspicions that JRTN was the organization behind the attacks (previous beliefs that JRTN was behind the attacks were just guesses, very good guesses but guesses nonetheless). This video made my week and what was really great was I was able to thank the individual who sent me the product in person when the squadron was redeploying and I spent several days on the base where this product was produced.
Unfortunately we were unable to catch those responsible for the attacks in the short time we had left, but we did pass this info off to 2-14 Cav and when you can give a replacing unit hard evidence and proof of the operations of an insurgent organization that's always a good thing. The only thing that really frustrates me about the entire situation was that I had to get this open source product from an outside organization and not from my brigade. I don't expect Brigade to have an open source section, but they should be tapped in to the organizations that do and be passing on that information.
The other "int's" (SIGINT, HUMINT, etc) often receive far more attention in training and in the field despite the vast amount of data that can be gleamed from open source. All too often commanders, executive officers, and S2's (myself included) demand intelligence collection and analysis be done using the other "int's" as well as the government's secure internet server when a couple hours on 'Google' may give the same, if not better, results.
The Army devotes entire MOS's and weeks long courses to the other intelligence functions but very little focus is given to OSINT; perhaps one class of a couple of hours duration at best. More time and effort should be spent teaching the value and resources that can be used of open source.
I bring this all up because at the moment I'm remembering a situation 1-14 Cav faced this last deployment in which OSINT assisted in helping.
We had a rather problematic JRTN cell (or cells, I'll probably never know) that liked to hit our Strykers with command wire and victim initiated IEDs on the main route from Jalula to Qara Tapa. B Troop rectified the problem initially by detaining two of the key individuals we believed were responsible for the attacks and Special Forces rounded up a third. This helped for a few months but unfortunately two of the detained men were eventually released and IEDs became a problem again a couple of months after their release.
The B Troop commander, always looking for a fight, was not too upset by the attacks because they never caused any damage or injury with the exception of the occasional busted tire or mild concussion. He began his own little information operations (IO) campaign in an attempt to cause the JRTN cell to make a mistake and get themselves caught. Whenever one of the local leaders in the area commented on the attacks, Bronco 6 would mention that he was glad the IEDs were hitting his vehicles as opposed to the police, Iraqi Army, or civilians because if the IEDs went off on Strykers, no damage would be caused and no one would get hurt. It was his way of saying to the insurgents "keep it up dirtbags, you suck at it anyway."
I fully understand, as did the B troop commander, that we were getting hit because we had established patterns on that particular route. It was the quickest road from FOB Cobra to two of the combined checkpoints that were manned by B troop. The insurgents knew that we would use that road often and consistently. All they had to do was wait for a convoy of Strykers to go by, knowing that in a couple of hours those same Strykers (or the Strykers those Strykers were replacing) would come right back down that road. I made a large assumption that the individuals who planted the IED were likely still in the area filming the attack because that's what JRTN did for both propaganda purposes and for proof of the attack to get paid.
But where were those individuals hiding?
The answer would come late in the deployment from a weekly product created by an organization not affliated with my brigade. The product was a rollup of the messages, videos, and propaganda posted on the internet by the different insurgent organizations operating in Iraq. I found myself on the contact list for this product when I discovered a friend of mine, who had gotten out of the Army, was in theatre working as a contractor and I noticed her name at the beginning of an email chain. She in turn sent me this product weekly which happened to be made by a guy I went to the career course with...another under utilized intel tool, networking, remember, it's a small Army.
Back to the point...on one of the products was a link to a website that showed an attack against an American Army vehicle somewhere in Diyala Province. The website was a JRTN site and since my squadron was the only one with a JRTN problem so I figured this had to be one of our attacks. The site even mentioned which cell conducted the attack, 2nd platoon / 2nd company / 101st brigade (JRTN names its cells in a military manner). I passed off the link to B troop who then went out to the site and based off the video were able to determine exactly where it was filmed from.
Thanks to open source and the internet, we now knew the location of where insurgents were filming the attacks as well as confirmed our suspicions that JRTN was the organization behind the attacks (previous beliefs that JRTN was behind the attacks were just guesses, very good guesses but guesses nonetheless). This video made my week and what was really great was I was able to thank the individual who sent me the product in person when the squadron was redeploying and I spent several days on the base where this product was produced.
Unfortunately we were unable to catch those responsible for the attacks in the short time we had left, but we did pass this info off to 2-14 Cav and when you can give a replacing unit hard evidence and proof of the operations of an insurgent organization that's always a good thing. The only thing that really frustrates me about the entire situation was that I had to get this open source product from an outside organization and not from my brigade. I don't expect Brigade to have an open source section, but they should be tapped in to the organizations that do and be passing on that information.
Friday, January 14, 2011
Blowing up and rebuilding villages
I've meant to post a couple of times this week but Civilization V is destroying my free time. Stupid addicting game. If I had a dedicated desk and computer at work I would blog from there (hooray for wasting taxpayer money!) but for the time being I can only jump on a computer when our division NCOIC is away. Some of you may be thinking that I should just take over the NCOIC's desk since I outrank him, but I'd much rather him have the desk since he actually does work.
So anyway, check out this blog post from Tom Ricks. It's a discussion from a correspondent in Afghanistan about a village wiped out after the Taliban had taken it over and U.S. forces determined they just couldn't allow that. Look at those before and after pictures...wow. We basically destroyed a village in order to save it.
A few wars ago, or even a few years ago, the commanders on the ground would have likely said something along the lines of "well that sucks for the people but the enemy was there, so too bad." This time the battalion on the ground did the absolute correct thing and worked to begin rebuilding the entire village. They even went about it the right way; instead of just throwing money at the villagers and calling it mission complete they worked with the local government, contractors, and the villagers themselves to rebuild the village. The battalion even put in the extra effort to get deeds to the land for the villagers.
Hopefully this turns into a success story.
So anyway, check out this blog post from Tom Ricks. It's a discussion from a correspondent in Afghanistan about a village wiped out after the Taliban had taken it over and U.S. forces determined they just couldn't allow that. Look at those before and after pictures...wow. We basically destroyed a village in order to save it.
A few wars ago, or even a few years ago, the commanders on the ground would have likely said something along the lines of "well that sucks for the people but the enemy was there, so too bad." This time the battalion on the ground did the absolute correct thing and worked to begin rebuilding the entire village. They even went about it the right way; instead of just throwing money at the villagers and calling it mission complete they worked with the local government, contractors, and the villagers themselves to rebuild the village. The battalion even put in the extra effort to get deeds to the land for the villagers.
Hopefully this turns into a success story.
Sunday, January 9, 2011
Update on Diyala
Being the curious individual that I am and having put a lot of effort into the security of Northeast Diyala Province I am always wondering what exactly is going in that little corner of the world. Some would prefer to forget; I, on the other hand, like updates.
However, getting up to date info on the region is difficult unless something goes boom and since I promised my warrant officer that I wouldn't attempt to email our replacements I am forced to get what little news on the region from unclassified sources...like the interwebs.
Stryker Brigade News is normally a good source for news links on the various Stryker brigades operating around the world and that site linked to a news story about 2-25 SAAB (Stryker Advise and Assist Brigade, basically the "non combat" Stryker Brigade Combat Team) and their first 100 days in Iraq.
The news of course is boring...no real change for 2-14 Cavalry from what 1-14 Cavalry was doing. They still man the combined checkpoints with the Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces and deal with the Kurd-Arab tension issue that is paramount to the security of northern Iraq. One bit that did jump out at me was that there are three bilateral checkpoints, Kurd-Arab controlled, that have been established and have posed no issues. That's a good sign to the region. One of those checkpoints was being set up as 1-14 Cav was leaving and it's nice to know that not only is it still functioning, but the Kurdish and Arab leadership have agreed to two more. A good step forward in my opinion.
In non Iraq news: Southern Sudanese voters headed to the polls today to determine if South Sudan should declare independence from the rest of Sudan. It will be interesting to learn if the referendum passes and if it is seen as legitimate. This is a development that I will attempt to follow closely as violence could easy break out, especially over the oil fields that seperate north from south Sudan.
However, getting up to date info on the region is difficult unless something goes boom and since I promised my warrant officer that I wouldn't attempt to email our replacements I am forced to get what little news on the region from unclassified sources...like the interwebs.
Stryker Brigade News is normally a good source for news links on the various Stryker brigades operating around the world and that site linked to a news story about 2-25 SAAB (Stryker Advise and Assist Brigade, basically the "non combat" Stryker Brigade Combat Team) and their first 100 days in Iraq.
The news of course is boring...no real change for 2-14 Cavalry from what 1-14 Cavalry was doing. They still man the combined checkpoints with the Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces and deal with the Kurd-Arab tension issue that is paramount to the security of northern Iraq. One bit that did jump out at me was that there are three bilateral checkpoints, Kurd-Arab controlled, that have been established and have posed no issues. That's a good sign to the region. One of those checkpoints was being set up as 1-14 Cav was leaving and it's nice to know that not only is it still functioning, but the Kurdish and Arab leadership have agreed to two more. A good step forward in my opinion.
In non Iraq news: Southern Sudanese voters headed to the polls today to determine if South Sudan should declare independence from the rest of Sudan. It will be interesting to learn if the referendum passes and if it is seen as legitimate. This is a development that I will attempt to follow closely as violence could easy break out, especially over the oil fields that seperate north from south Sudan.
Saturday, January 8, 2011
Timbuk...where?
As I mentioned in my previous post, there's a pretty good article in this month's National Geographic about the Malinese city of Timbuktu. I even managed to find it online for you guys. The article is primarily about the history of the city and large amount of ancient texts and manuscripts in the hands of its citizens, libraries, and mosques. The city has so many books and scholars because of Timbuktu's location along the caravan routes from Egypt to Western Africa. It's a very good read if you have the time.
A map for the geographically challenged. Timbuktu is the city in the middle of the country.
What interested me the most was the discussion in the article about Al Qaida in the Islamic Mahgreb and that organization's influence and effect on the region. AQIM has kidnapped many westerners in the area and held them for ransom which has severely decreased tourism for Timbuktu.
Also included is a paragraph on how AQIM spread its power in Mali. The group's leader in Mali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar "Belaouer" (Algerian-French slang for "the One-Eye"), gained the protection from the tribes of northern Mali by marrying the daughter of one of the more powerful chiefs. The Malinese Army doesn't conduct operations against him because some of Belaouer's men assasinated an army colonel in Timbuktu in front of his family.
Marrying into the tribe is one of the primary means of Al Qaida linked organizations and other terrorist organizations gain access and protection in the areas they wish to operate. It occured in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and virtually every place AQ has attempted to establish itself. They tried it in the Anbar Province of Iraq but they apparently overstepped their bounds, either due to the tribes in that area disliking the idea of foreigners marrying their daughters, or because AQ leaders demanded the marriages thus angering the tribal leaders.
The assasination of the colonel as an intimidation factor is also very familiar in Iraq and in 1-14 Cav's old operating environment as well. A very similar situation occured in the Tibij area of our OE which was just across the river from FOB Cobra to the west. I don't recall when, but I believe just prior to our arrival, an Iraqi Army lieutenant colonel was tortured and brutally killed by the local Al Qaida in Iraq cell outside his home in front of his family and many of the local villagers also witnessed the incident. After the assassination, the cell leader called the nearby Iraqi Army battalion intelligence officer and told him what they had done. The intel officer and a patrol arrived on the scene just as the cell members were leaving. In the coming days the cell would text message several of the IA officers and warn them that they would be next if they continued to target the AQI cell. That IA battalion was the most ineffective and challenging battalion to work with in the brigade we assisted due to the intimidation they faced.
Never underestimate the ruthlessness of your opponent...or the effectiveness of his tactics.
Wednesday, January 5, 2011
Hemorrhaging officers and an apathetic nation
Don't have much for you guys but since it's been a few days since I've posted I'll throw out some articles that I read today that I found interesting.
An article discussing why officers are leaving the Army. The author points to a recent study that polled both officers who are currently serving and who have recently left the Army. Multiple and long deployments are not necessarily a factor for the exodus of our best officers but it is a issue. Painful bureaucracy, standard promotion times for everyone with no regard to merit, and a broken career management system are primarily to blame. I couldn't agree more. When choosing my next assignment I was asked for a list of 15 "jobs" of a list of around 40 or 50 openings; that list was apparently ignored and I was sent to Huachuca to be an instructor. Not horrible, but not really what I wanted. Then, when I arrive here, someone up at G1 (personnel) decides I'm not going to be an instructor but a nameless cog in the Intel Center bureaucratic machine (Not quite nameless, but close. My military boss called me by the wrong name yesterday).
The second article is about the volunteer military and how out of touch American citizens are with that military and the current wars. People cared about Vietnam because they were drafted and sent over there, or they had a relative or close friend who was. The population was affected by the conflict which in turn shaped politics. Today very few people (around 1% of the population) serve in the military and most folks often do not know anyone deployed. The conflicts do not touch them or matter; taxes are not raised and goods are not rationed. The Army went to war while the country went shopping.
Thanks to Jake "The Snake" for the links.
Pretty good article in the latest National Geographic on Timbuktu that I'll likely write about in a day or two.
An article discussing why officers are leaving the Army. The author points to a recent study that polled both officers who are currently serving and who have recently left the Army. Multiple and long deployments are not necessarily a factor for the exodus of our best officers but it is a issue. Painful bureaucracy, standard promotion times for everyone with no regard to merit, and a broken career management system are primarily to blame. I couldn't agree more. When choosing my next assignment I was asked for a list of 15 "jobs" of a list of around 40 or 50 openings; that list was apparently ignored and I was sent to Huachuca to be an instructor. Not horrible, but not really what I wanted. Then, when I arrive here, someone up at G1 (personnel) decides I'm not going to be an instructor but a nameless cog in the Intel Center bureaucratic machine (Not quite nameless, but close. My military boss called me by the wrong name yesterday).
The second article is about the volunteer military and how out of touch American citizens are with that military and the current wars. People cared about Vietnam because they were drafted and sent over there, or they had a relative or close friend who was. The population was affected by the conflict which in turn shaped politics. Today very few people (around 1% of the population) serve in the military and most folks often do not know anyone deployed. The conflicts do not touch them or matter; taxes are not raised and goods are not rationed. The Army went to war while the country went shopping.
Thanks to Jake "The Snake" for the links.
Pretty good article in the latest National Geographic on Timbuktu that I'll likely write about in a day or two.
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