In December I wrote a brief summary of the books about Afghanistan that I read prior to, or during, my latest deployment. I've already covered Caravans so the next book on the list is The Bear Went Over the Mountain by Lester Grau. As I wrote in my previous post, Bear is essentially a collection of after action reviews critiquing Soviet tactics and operations in Afghanistan. Below are some quotes that stuck out at me with my own comments:
"The citizens of the Soviet Union did not understand why their sons were being conscripted for battle in a strange land and failed to see how their sacrifices contributed to the security of the fatherland. Those with connections sought to avoid the draft. Unlike their fathers who fought the Nazi invaders, the returning soldiers were not welcomed as heroes or treated with respect. They were shunned and often scorned by their fellow citizens. A gap opened between the Armed Forces and the citizenry and many veterans found they could not fit back into the lifestyle of the complacent and self-centered citizenry."
Well doesn't this seems familiar...
"However, unlike in the United States Army (in Vietnam), the Afghanistan war was not an all-encompassing experience for the officer corps. Barely 10 percent of the Soviet motorized rifle, armor, aviation and artillery officers served in Afghanistan."
This is how you burn out an army. Send only a small portion of it to a conflict over and over and over again. This policy also keeps combat experience to a small minority when modern combat experience is crucial for the effectiveness of an army. I realize the Soviets were more concerned with NATO and Europe at the time but this policy just appears short sighted to me.
"As in Vietnam, tactics needed a major overhaul to meet the changed circumstances. Units which adapted enjoyed relative success while units which did not paid a price in blood."
It's easy to stick with the status quo. Forcing adaptation in any large organization takes a leader (often several) willing to try different approaches to a problem.
"Excellent results were achieved by suddenly blocking-off those regions which had been the site of military activity several days prior."
My experience in Iraq showed that when we cleared a neighborhood or small town the insurgents typically stayed away for a few weeks to a couple of months before they returned. In Afghanistan they were often back the next day. Change things up a bit and go back into an area you just cleared seems counterproductive and a waste of time but the results may surprise you.
"Although inspections are good ideas, these massive formal inspections were almost always conducted before a planned action. Any mujahideen in the vicinity were tipped off that an action was pending and could sound the warning."
Ahh, communists and their constant need for inspections. I'd fault them for this but to be perfectly honest, insurgents are going to find out about any major action hours if not days or weeks before you conduct it. Two men can keep a secret if one of them is dead and all that.
"The Soviet force did a weak job of reconnaissance. Their failure to seize the dominant terrain allowed the enemy to suppress practically the entire company area with fire."
Recon will likely tip off the enemy that your coming but if done right will keep you from being slaughtered. Modern militaries have the luxury of UAVs and satellite imagery but even a couple of light armored vehicles looking unimportant and checking out several different areas can be useful. That part of failing to seize dominant terrain? That's just begging for trouble when your in a valley in Afghanistan.
"Soviet artillery was hard pressed to “hip shoot” without their own FO on the ground. Soviet normative firing methodology was unsuited for combating mobile guerrilla forces who refused to stay put for massed artillery fires."
Damn insurgents not doing what we want them to do!
"The mujahideen did not react to the helicopter flight since we used Mi-6 helicopters – a cargo helicopter not usually used for air assaults. This deception effort against the enemy paid off."
If you can lull your enemy into a sense of complacency so that he doesn't react to your first few chess moves you've gone a long way to defeating him...today anyway.
"...misleading the enemy as to the actual region in which the combat actions were planned (through information supplied to the Afghan division..."
You have to work with local security forces when fighting an insurgency, but those "allies" often accidentally, or in many cases purposely, leak information to the insurgents. This tactic of giving false location data of an assault may work a few times, but it will create resentment within your partnered forces and a lack of trust.
"Tactical surprise gained from air landings and air assaults dissipates rapidly."
Insurgents are always more tactically maneuverable than you are...always.
"As a rule, they would lure us into predetermined areas and then open fire on us at a distance of no more than 50 to 100 meters."
If there is a possibility, hell, a high likelihood, of getting blown up by your own artillery or close air support then you are less inclined to call it in.
"The sweep would seize supply caches and draft young men on the spot into the Afghan army."
What's an excellent way to keep an insurgency going and make your job even harder? Instead of protecting the population, force them into a job they don't want to do. No wonder the communist Afghan Army faced high desertion rates.
"However, using standard or SOP displays of panels or pyrotechnics to mark friendly positions or communicate with pilots is risky. The enemy is quick to learn these codes and to use them against the force which needs air support."
Hell, even with all our technology, the US Air Force still sometimes drops bombs on friendly soldiers. Pilots are dumb. (Oh shit, shots fired!)
"The Soviets apparently showed little concern for the civilian population and started each sweep with an artillery bombardment."
What's a surefire way of keeping an insurgency going other than forced conscription? Blowing up everything in site. It may have been effective for the Mongols, but it won't be effective for you.
"The dummy airborne drop was a masterful use of deception to discover enemy firing positions."
Simple, I love it.
"The force failed to clear the roads ahead of time and was three hours late. This appears to be a failure to conduct proper reconnaissance."
Never interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake. The muj must have been having a field day with this one.
"The Soviet military would have liked to employ far more helicopters in Afghanistan, however, the lack of maintenance facilities, the increased logistics demand and the lack of secure operating bases prevented this."
This is just a long sentence of excuses and bullshit.
"On the day before the attempt, they did a reconnaissance of our obstacles by driving a large flock of sheep into our mine field."
I love this so much. Plus sheep are stupid.
"The mujahideen learned to take out command vehicles early in the battle."
When the US first invaded and occupied Afghanistan there were reports of platoon leaders being targeted quite often by the insurgents. The reason was that the Afghans had found out that Soviet troops could not operate effectively, or at all, without officer leadership. What does a US platoon do when they lose their officer? Carry on this mission, the lieutenant was probably a jackass anyway.
"The Soviet Army seldom left a clean bivouac area or fighting position."
First rule of camping and hunting insurgents...leave no trace. You are both the hunter and the hunted when it comes to counter insurgency.
"The lack of a professional NCO corps and the lack of trust in junior officers kept the battalion leadership doing jobs other armies would entrust to lieutenants and sergeants."
There are times when I think the US military is a mess and that the Soviets would have wiped the floor with us. Then I read sentences like this and it makes me smile.
"And in the end, the soldier and officer returned to a changing Soviet Union. Many were unable to fit back into this staid, bland society. Many of the officers asked to go back to Afghanistan."
This certainly hits close to home...
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