I've mentioned a few times in this blog that I admire the Marines and their (often superior) counter insurgency skills. From the Combined Action Program in Vietnam to foot patrols in Afghanistan, the Marines tend to figure things out quicker...probably because they have less to work with and are forced to figure things out quicker.
I found myself admiring Marines once again during a briefing to MG Nicholson (Marine general in charge of ISAF's Ops...essentially) the other day. We were discussing how the people of Afghanistan have a "group think" attitude. No one does anything without permission of the tribe/tribal elders. While this was generally the case in Iraq, it's much more the norm in Afghan culture. A young man in Afghanistan won't/can't join the army/police, get married, start a business, etc., without first receiving consent from the tribe.
MG Nicholson mentioned that when he was in Helmand Province the headquarters had two maps. One indicated areas where young men were joining the army (green/red) and another indicated areas where people were attending school (once again...red/green). Those areas that were green showed districts that were likely pro-goverment while those that were red were likely pro-Taliban. If the Taliban controlled an area then the tribal elders likely wouldn't let their people join the security forces or attend government-run schools. An interesting way of measuring metrics.
From my perspective, utilizing these maps is a pretty intelligent way of determining how your counter insurgency fight is going. Most staffs tend to focus on insurgents killed/captured or number of IEDs that go boom as a metric...which fails to really illustrate the overall situation. There is no "cookie-cutter" approach either and just because one system works in a certain area doesn't mean it will work in another. How long did it take the Marines in Helmand to figure out this particular solution?
As for my little corner of Iraq? We didn't use any official metrics that I can recall. I had my own unofficial ones, but I didn't track them on any PowerPoint or map. I looked at the number of attacks on civilians compared to attacks on Iraqi security forces and against 1-14 Cav. I figured if the insurgents were primarily attacking Strykers and not civilians the area was doing alright. Also, if the Kurds and Iraqis were willing to meet in the same room and not argue too much...or kill eachother, we were successful.
On the topic of the Marines, I asked Tom Ricks about why they were different when he was in Seattle. I noted that the Marines had relieved a regimental commander early in the Iraq war, in contrast to the Army which promoted mediocrity, and that one doesn't hear of the kinds of under-performance among the Marine officer corps.
ReplyDeleteRicks suggested that the Marines, as part of the nautical tradition, have a greater sense of "responsibility for the ship" idea, and hold their leaders accountable.
Along with their history as you have mentioned, (as well as their early history- see the 1930's Small Wars Manual) and current accomplishments, one wonders why the Marines are so much better and why the Army can't be brought to that level (or if the Marines should bee the recipient of most of the tasking and resources for Afghanistan.
-Kyle
I thought about mentioning all the small wars of the early 20th century the Marines were involved with that have led to their counterinsurgency institutional knowledge...but I got distracted with...you know...the insurgency here.
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