Marines doing it better

One of my favorite authors on counterinsurgency practice and theory, Bing West, recently had an article in the Wall Street Journal. It's a short article that discusses a patrol that West went on with a Marine squad in Afghanistan while West was imbedded with the platoon. The tactics of the squad reminded me of the tactics used by CAPs in Vietnam which West wrote about in The Village. (I discuss the book and my thoughts on the tactics used here.)

There are a few differences that I see in the Marines' tactics in this particular case and those used in Vietnam, namely that the Marines are conducting their patrol during the day as opposed to night. The Vietcong tended to do their business at night (I'm assuming, based on my limited reading of the conflict) whereas the Taliban apparently do theirs during the day (Iraqi insurgents in 2009-10 operated in much the same way). Another difference is that the article makes no mention of any Afghan security forces embedded with the platoon and even specifically mentions the squad has no interpreter.

"With no...language capabilities, the platoon knew who was an enemy only when he opened fire."

I am impressed though that the Marines are focused on patrolling on foot instead of driving around in HMMWVs or MRAPs which rarely accomplish anything. I'm also impressed in their restraint; the locals appear to be very hostile and the group on the motorcycles were very likely Taliban fighters, but the Marines didn't engage. This keeps colateral damage to a minimum and also prevents a situation which the Marines in the area may not be able to fix. What if the men on the motorcycles were not Taliban, but instead just a local militia or village protection that were just making their presence known to the Marines? Opening fire on them would only drive a massive wedge between the locals and the Marines.

Not going into the empty house suspected of having an IED inside was also a smart move, a lesson likely learned painfully. In 2007 my battalion (1-23 IN) lost 4 soldiers and an interpreter when searching an empty house suspected of being booby trapped. The entire house collapsed on them when one of the soldiers accidently set off the triggering device hidden under a rug.

Given enough time and resources...namely interpreters and some local security forces...the Marines in this area of southern Afghanistan will likely have some pretty good success in defeating the Taliban. Time is not something the Marines have, however, and unless similar tactics are being used in eastern Afghanistan by the Army then the efforts by this platoon may be for naught. Best quote of the article has to be this one:

"Marine tactics, like Ohio State football, have the subtle inevitability of a steamroller."