Sunday, May 23, 2010

The future of the MI Corps will be taught by...What?! Are you kidding me?!

Back long long ago, in the before time, when I was a very new and very green lieutentant my first impressions of the officers of the Military Intelligence branch came from a select few captains and majors who taught and mentored at the military intelligence officer basic course. I looked up to those officers and did my best to learn from them. They had both the experience and knowledge that I never thought I would have and I never expected to reach a level in the Army that would allow for me to follow in their footsteps.


Even when I went to the MI Captains Career Course I looked up to the officer instructors. Even though I had two deployments at that time these were guys who had been battalion level intelligence officers and brigade assistant intelligence officers in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and sometimes both. My career at that point had been as a maintenance platoon leader, a support battalion intelligence officer, and an assitant infantry battalion intelligence officer...nothing really that spectacular. Once again I found myself thinking that there was no way I could do what they do or assume the Army would ever select me to instruct at one of officer courses.


By some twist of fate the Army has selected me to be an instructor at FT Huachuca for either the basic course or the career course. It's not exactly what I wanted to do, or my first location for an assignment, but the more I think about it, the more I find myself looking forward to this new assignment. First off, it will be a challenge (of course I was looking for a challenge when I came to 1-14 CAV and had no idea how challenging it would end up being). Second, I won't deploy for a few years which is great. Third, I was starting to really enjoy southeast Arizona during my time in the MICCC and this will give me an opportunity to explore the area even more. Finally, this is my time to share my experiences with the future assistant and primary S2's of the Army. Hopefully I can have some input on how either the basic course or the career course is run and taught, depending on which course I'm chosen to be an instructor for.


I also want to prepare them for this:

Today's MI captains are being asked to know and do more than at any other time
in our Army's history. They must be specialists and generalists, sometimes
functioning at the strategic, operational, and tactical level simultaneously.
They are held to a higher standard based on the perceived capabilities to
collect intelligence they may or may not have access to. Their contemporaries
are leaving the Army in droves. Courtesy of thefreelibrary.com

This statement is entirely true. As an S2 at the battalion level not only am I expected to know what the enemy is doing in my squadron's area, but also what the enemy is doing throughout the brigade's area, especially if it affects us. Since our Squadron area borders two other brigades as well, I have to coordinate and share information with battalion S2's that I have never met and whose contact information often takes a good deal of networking to acquire. Last deployment I was questioned weekly on what was going on in other provinces entirely such as Al Anbar and Salah Al Din, and expected to give a professional opinion on the spot with no warning. Hell, back in late 2006 when North Korea conducted a nuclear blast test I was asked to give my assessment on whether or not the North Koreans had been successful or not since it wasn't really known. That question really threw me off since I am not an expert in that area of the globe, had no access to or ability to interpret information from the scene, and was focusing my attention on THE LITTLE CONFLICT GOING ON RIGHT OUTSIDE THE GATE called Mosul. And yet, an informed answer to the question was still expected.


The words "perceived capabilities to collect" is what leads to frustration and anger which ultimately leads to situations that I discussed in the last post. Battalion level S2 is one of the most difficult and challenging assignments an officer can have. LTs and captains coming into that need to be prepared.
There's an old saying in the Army: operational success or intelligence failure. Meaning, if a mission is successful it is because the planning was good and the leadership capable. If the mission failed, it was because the intelligence picture was wrong. Unfair? You bet. But that's the world and the life of an intelligence professional.

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Gripes of a staff officer

We in the military attempt to tell ourselves that we are all in this fight together. "One team, one fight" is a common saying. It doesn't matter if you are Army, Navy, Air Force, Reserves, or National Guard. We're all in this suckfest together and we all need to work together to get the mission done.

This especially the case at the battalion and brigade level where everyone should be working with eachother and providing assistance to one another. If people are backstabbing eachother or you can't stand that guy in the office next to you so you don't bother giving him that information he needs that you have, things go down hill fast. In a best case scenario it leads to a hostile work environment.

Unfortunately I've seen this over and over in the course of my 3 deployments with 4 different battalions/squadron. It was pretty bad in my time in the 502nd MI BN. There was no "lieutenant mafia" (LTs in most units band together to keep eachother afloat and help get through the first couple years of the Army). The company XOs were all in competition with themselves to see who could impress the battalion XO. Staff officers hoarded information until they could bring it up in a weekly meeting and look good while the staff officer who needed that info 3 days prior now looks like a shitbag to the boss.

I don't think we really had that kind of problem in 296 BSB while I was there. There was some infighting and staff disgruntlement that always occurs on a deployment when people are forced together for so long. In 1-23IN the S2 kept his staff out of the loop on pretty much everything. I don't believe he did it on purpose, he just didn't trust his subordinates to do anything so he did almost all the work himself.

A problem really starts to create issues when company/troop commanders don't, or refuse, to talk with the battalion/squadron staff. In a counterinsurgency fight information comes from the bottom and feeds up. The platoons and companies on the ground are going to have a much better understanding of the area and are able to provide the most information to higher levels than corps/division/brigade can provide down. In a conventional fight, corps/division provides more information to lower levels while platoons/companies fill in a few gaps.

So when a troop commander refuses to share or give information...such as a location to a house or his thoughts on what is going on in his little corner of the world...the machine begins to break down. The situation is rather amusing in a way, if operations weren't affected. Troop commanders expect the staff to work for them, which the staff does, and provide higher analysis of what is going on. Difficult to do when a commander won't provide basic information or sit down and discuss things with the staff.

I'm done now. Hopefully I'll have something worthwhile to discuss in the near future instead of my random gripes.

Friday, May 14, 2010

The party is over

Big Army...well at least bigger than my level...has discovered this blog. They aren't shutting me down or anything and I'm a little flattered that I actually have drawn some attention. I just got a warning for discussing a bit more than I should have discussed.

In other news, it's hot. Really hot. And dusty. Miserably dusty. There goes the 2 weeks of Iraqi spring. Hello summer.

Shout out to everyone at Brigade reading this. How's Salsa Night?

Sunday, May 9, 2010

Settling back to normal

Tensions are still higher than usual in our little corner of Diyala, but we haven't had any major events since our little incident in Qara Tapa last week. Right now everyone seems to be just taking a breather and waiting for the final election results to come out some time in the near future. Well, everyone except that really annoying indirect fire team who keeps pestering our checkpoints.

The last few folks are heading out on leave and we've begun planning for our replacements as well as reintegration back at FT Lewis, or rather, Joint Base Lewis-McChord. The great thing about staff planning for relief-in-place and reintegration is that it doesn't really involve me at all. The intelligence shop has some tasks of course, but a majority of the planning is done by the supply, personnel, and operations sections. Great feeling after being the primary section for planning during combat operations.

Less than 90 days to go before 1-14 CAV leaves Iraq.

Monday, May 3, 2010

Events are becoming dicey

We nearly had our Arab vs Kurd civil war the other day up here in Northeast Diyala. I don't think it would have broken down into a full scale civil war throughout the entire disputed zone, but it could have.

It all started with a parking infraction.

Tensions apparently have been pretty high between the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army here for a few weeks now. I was out of the loop while I was on leave but our little tripartite missions are becoming more and more difficult to coordinate and conduct. The trust and partnerships we were attempting to build with both our combined checkpoints and tripartite operations is beginning to crumble...but I'm likely exaggerating the situation a bit.

The other day in Qara Tapa a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) official decided to park his car in the marketplace. This is normally not that big of a deal, many people park in the marketplace. The problem on this day however was that the Iraqi Army had reports of a possible carbomb in the area and were not letting just anyone park in the market. The soldiers told the PUK official to move his vehicle. He refused.

He was also apparently drunk (I got that bit of info from an Iraqi Army officer so it may not be true).

His friend was also apparently drunk and made the situation worse.

The PUK official tried to claim that other people were parked in the market and he should be allowed to park there as well because he was important. The IA soldiers didn't know who he was so figured he was just being an idiot. The PUK official's friend got belligerant and the IA decided they had enough of these two and detained them.

The Peshmerga brigade commander for the area got wind of this detainment and determined the best course of action was to send 75-100 Peshmerga soldiers to Qara Tapa to secure the PUK official's release.

100 Peshmerga surrounded the IA battalion HQ and blocked vehicle movement in the town. Tensions were high. We of course sent Strykers out to Qara Tapa to ensure that any fighting that broke out would be tripartite...because everything in the combined security area must involve all three parties.

Luckily, the arrival of Americans kickstarted common sense and the PUK official was released and both sides publicly apologized for the incident. It's almost too bad because had civil war broken out at that moment I could have said I was a witness to it all. I can imagine being interviewed 20 years later on the History Channel saying something like "it all started when some dumbass refused to move his car".

Now for the deep thought of the day:

About 2 weeks ago a Peshmerga vehicle blew up near an IA checkpoint. The Peshmerga blame the IA for either allowing the IED to be emplaced at the location or emplacing it themselves to blow up the Peshmerga. The IED was actually placed on the vehicle (a magnetic IED or MAIED). Intial thoughts are always "oh, it's likely just Al Qaeda attacking security forces in the area".

But what if it's deeper than that...which it most certainly is.

The soldiers blown up belong to the KDP, the other Kurdish political party. The KDP and PUK have kept seperate battalions, seperate police, and seperate intelligence services throughout Kurdistan. For the Peshmerga, the battalion you joined depended on which political party you belonged to and the two political parties funded the units that belonged to them. The Kurdish Regional Government has been attempting to combine all organizations split by party into one. For the Peshmerga, units would be merged down to platoon level.

You can never simplify things in Iraq. One must remember that there are two political parties in Kurdistan for a reason. The KDP and PUK at one time fought a mini Kurdish civil war. The two parties have been serious rivals for a long time.

Was this MAIED attack Kurd on Kurd violence? Did PUK Peshmerga soldiers deliberately plant the IED in order to do harm to rival soldiers? Or possibly to disrupt tripartite operations and were willing to sacrifice some KDP soldiers to do it?

And you thought Democrats and Republicans were bad.

Monday, April 19, 2010

Interesting developments

Still stuck in Atlanta due to the volcano in Iceland.

However, this is some great news. Not sure how the deaths of the top leaders of Al Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq will really affect 1-14 CAV but it certainly can't hurt. In my opinion, Al Masri appeared to be a much better leader and organizer than Zarqawi and AQI actually benefitted when Zarqawi was killed in 2006. I'm not sure who else was captured in the mission and I'm sure there are other guys to take the top spots but it is unlikely they will be very effective.

I could see either a significant drop in attacks, especially the spectacular attacks that have occured in Baghdad, but I could also see an increase in a lot of little attacks as groups break off from AQI and ISI and attempt to regain influence and stay relevant.

Really, really want to get back now.

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Worst blogger ever returns...

No, I haven't been ignoring this blog on purpose. I just haven't had the desire or the motivation to discuss anything. Due to current operations in Iraq officially being considered "classified" that forces me to walk the fine line of attempting to discuss what is going on without divulging information the Army feels the public shouldn't know just yet...and shutting me down as the Army has to other bloggers.

Of course I don't think I have enough readers to warrant the Army even noticing this blog and the section that is technically responsible for operational security and warning soldiers of possible violations on the web is led by...well, me.

The job also keeps me from taking time to gather my thoughts into a coherant couple of paragraphs that my few readers may find interesting or amusing. What time I do find to get on the internet is spent surfing Facebook or checking my email.

The unfortunate part though is that even though I have been on leave for the past couple of weeks I haven't written a single entry until now...only a few days from going back to Iraq. Perhaps that was a good move, I didn't really want to think about Iraq while I was on leave.

I'll be going to Chattanooga tomorrow with my parents and visiting the Chickamauga and Chattanooga battlefields so there is a possibility of a post about those sites...maybe even pictures! I can sense the excitement from all 4 of you.

I also just finished The Savage Wars of Peace by Max Boot so that gives me yet another blog post if I feel inclined. My Christmas/Birthday gift from my parents was a Kindle, giving me an excuse to read more lame "professional development" books and post my thoughts on them here so there is a slight possibility of increased posts in the future...but don't count on it.

Once I get back for good I may attempt a series of blogs chronciling what 1-14 CAV did in the NE Diyala Province. Highlights likely to include:

- Why you should get a warrant BEFORE attempting to capture that high level sheikh's brother
- Suicide bombing...just another form of Iraqi politics
- If the first raid doesn't succeed, maybe the 2nd, 3rd, or maybe even the 6th will
- Coloring books...a more powerful weapon than a soldier with a rifle
- The Mad Mortarmen
- Peshmerga, Kurdish for "paper tiger"

There's only about 3 1/2 more months left in the deployment, give or take a couple of weeks. Care packages are still very welcome and to answer the comment left by Alyson in the last post: snacks, especially Oreos for some reason, magazines, trailmix, mixed nuts, coffee are all appreciated.